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NIETZSCHE ON TRUTH AND THE WILL 
 
Steven Michels 
 
Abstract 
 
The fundamental — and many would say lingering — challenge to Nietzsche concerns how he can 
ground the will to power, given what he says about metaphysics as a philosophic prejudice. Does his 
teaching not topple of its own weight/lessness? It is the standard objection to which all postmodern 
philosophers must respond. This article examines what Nietzsche says about the limits of truth and the 
role that experience and perspective have in setting standards by which we might live correctly. The 
will to power, Nietzsche instructs, is a claim on truth, confirmed only to the extent that it serves life and 
culture. Hence Nietzsche’s most basic doctrine appears in nature as a source of order and value, without 
imposing itself as such. 
 
 
 
This world is the will to power — and nothing besides! And you 
yourselves are also this will to power — and nothing besides! 
(Nietzsche 1968, §1067) 
 
 
Although the centrality of the will to power to Nietzsche’s philosophy is nearly 
undisputed, what remains contentious is how Nietzsche can defend the will to power in a 
manner consistent with his break from Western rationalism. As Linda L. Williams 
summarizes the tension: “ultimately…a wholly univocal answer to the question ‘What is 
will to power?’ is not only impossible but also undesirable” (2001, p. x). She concludes, 
“interpreting will to power as Nietzsche’s empirical principle to which all experience can 
be reduced or interpreting will to power as Nietzsche’s science have the benefit of being 
in this world, but in my view they suffer from the implication that will to power 
somehow transcends Nietzsche’s perspectivism” (2001, p. 129).  
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Does Nietzsche, as Williams suggests, present an ambiguous or incongruous philosophy? 
Or does he, as Heidegger charges, relapse into metaphysics? Is the will to power a force 
for order or does it exemplify the chaos of the modern age? This article examines how, 
through his emphasis on perspectivism and life as the standard for truth, Nietzsche is able 
to use the will to power as the basis for his positive thought, while avoiding what he 
would call standard metaphysical trappings. 
 
The Problem of the Will 
 
The concept of the will came to Nietzsche through his reading of Schopenhauer. In his 
magnum opus, The World as Will and Idea, Schopenhauer argues that individuals, as 
conscious and reflective beings, interpret the world. This notion is established a priori, 
for “no truth is more certain, more independent of all the others, and less in need of proof, 
than this: that all that is there for the knowing — that is, the whole world — is only 
object in relation to the subject, perception of the perceiver — in a word, idea” 
(Schopenhauer 1995, Bk. 1 §1).  
 
Insofar as the world is subjective, or the subject of its perceiver, the world is also will. 
Schopenhauer claims: “the world as idea is a mirror which reflects the will. In this mirror 
the will recognizes itself in ascending grades of distinctness and completeness, the 
highest of which is man, whose nature, however, receives its complete expression only 
through the integrated series of his actions” (Schopenhauer 1995, Bk. 4 §54). This 
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combination of idea and will is the only logical, and indeed the only possible, ground for 
philosophy. “A reality that is neither of these two,” Schopenhauer writes, “is the absurd 
product of a dream, and its credence in philosophy is a treacherous will-o’-the wisp” 
(Schopenhauer 1995, Bk. 1 §1).  
 
Although Nietzsche followed Schopenhauer in using the will as the foundation for his 
philosophy, he broke with his teacher in a radical way. As Bryan Magee writes, 
“Nietzsche’s philosophy developed in such a way as to retain Schopenhauer’s insistence 
on the primacy of the will as its cardinal point, but to adopt an attitude towards the will 
which was the diametrical opposite of Schopenhauer’s” (1983, p. 269). Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche explains, thought the will was “really known to us, absolutely and completely 
known” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Nietzsche professes that the will is not known absolutely, 
nor can it be. The act of willing is not even a single entity; it is “a unity only as a word” 
(Nietzsche 1966, §19). Against Schopenhauer, Nietzsche posits the will as something 
“complicated” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer, like many 
philosophers, misunderstood the function of the will. Schopenhauer did not really know 
of the will: he merely accepted what others said of it and then expounded upon their 
view. Nietzsche tells us that, unlike Schopenhauer, he will be “cautious” and 
“unphilosophisch” (Nietzsche 1966, §19); much like the will itself, his treatment is 
“complicated.”  
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In his most succinct formulation, Nietzsche calls the will to power the “essence of life” 
(Nietzsche 1989b, §2.12; Cf. 1968, §254). Nietzsche suggests that the will is central to 
man’s existence: without it we would die. That, however, tells us nothing about its 
operation, only its importance. The same can be said of water, for example (see Nietzsche 
1998, §3). Is the will physical or psychological? What does it mean for a political 
community? In a sense, the will as “essence” is not so much a definition as it is a 
standard for judgment, a challenge to consider and perhaps accept Nietzsche’s philosophy 
as our own. Perhaps Nietzsche wishes to assess the composition of our will, to test his 
audience. If not the will, what is our essence? 
 
Although Nietzsche’s treatment of the will is far from simple, one thing is certain: by no 
means does the will to power mean the instinct for self-preservation. “Physiologists 
should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct 
of an organic being,” Nietzsche charges. “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its 
strength — life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and 
most frequent results” (Nietzsche 1966, §13). If anything, the drive for self-preservation 
is a sign of a weak will (Nietzsche 1974, §349). The strong and healthy have no need to 
concern themselves with preservation; it is the weak and fearful who must always pursue 
such an ignoble aim. The confusion of the will with self-preservation is merely one 
among many “superfluous teleological principles” common in modern philosophic 
discourse. Nietzsche’s new philosophy breaks with this tradition, and instead demands an 
“economy of principles” (Nietzsche 1966, §13).  
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Arguably, Nietzsche’s clearest, if not most comprehensive, statement on the will is found 
in Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche begins his instruction in Section 19, where he writes: 
“in all willing there is, first, a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the state 
‘away from which,’ the sensation of the state ‘towards which,’ the sensations of this 
‘from’ and ‘towards’ themselves, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation, 
which, even without our putting into motion ‘arms and legs,’ begins its action by force of 
habit as soon as we ‘will’ anything” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). As Nietzsche describes it, 
“we are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying 
party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, 
which usually begin immediately after the act of the will” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Many, 
like Schopenhauer, disregard this distinction and replace it with a specific and definite 
will that corresponds to the “synthetic concept ‘I’” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). For Nietzsche, 
however, activity itself is the only consideration; the “doer is merely a fiction added to 
the deed” (Nietzsche 1989b, §1.13). Both science and the “popular mind” suffer from 
“the misleading influence of language” and their attention to the “subject” (Nietzsche 
1989b, §1.13). In other words, treating the will as if it were absolute neglects its true 
nature and its actual effects. This was Schopenhauer’s error. Not only did he adopt the 
will from popular opinion, but he also treated a subjective precept as an objective fact.  
 
Although he breaks from Schopenhauer’s singular will known “absolutely and 
completely,” Nietzsche considers “all willing” more alike than not. The will may be a 
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“unity only as a word,” 1 but willing is always comprised of the same essential features: it 
contains a “plurality” of sensations that, when conflicted, must be reconciled. These 
“sensations” are those of affirmation or negation — the “away from which…[and the] 
towards which” — and they require a point of reference (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Willing 
demands recognition of the present and future, a condition of being and a desire to effect 
any change that occurs. The plurality of the will means a plurality of wills.  
 
For Nietzsche, willing means “willing an end” (Nietzsche 1968, §260). In this sense, the 
will is psychological, one instance of appetite or aversion. It is also physical in that we 
need to move our bodies in accordance with the sensation. The physical follows the 
psychological through “force of habit,” where every movement is directed by an act of 
the will (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Because the will necessarily contains an action or 
movement, it is impossible to will and not to act, a notion resembling what Hobbes had 
argued. Similarly, it is not possible to act, or to move, and not to will. Although the will 
should not be confused with the drive for self-preservation, will as “essence” implies that 
life is action, without which our lives would be left to chance (Nietzsche 1968, §673). 
Without the will, we would be as good as dead. Not surprisingly, Nietzsche alleges: 
“biologically, modern man represents a contradiction of values; he sits between two 
chairs, he says Yes and No in the same breath” (Nietzsche 1967b, Epilogue). Modern 
man is deficient not only in his understanding of the will, but in the action related to its 
full and healthy operation. 
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Perhaps the most important element of the will, or at least the one most overlooked, 
pertains to the consequences of willing. “What is strangest about the will,” Nietzsche 
observes, is that “he who wills believes sincerely that willing suffices for action” 
(Nietzsche 1966, §19). The result, Nietzsche insists, is the atrophy of the will. Since the 
will is used most often in times where obedience is a foregone conclusion, the full 
strength of the will is never realized or quickly forgotten. The plurality of sensations 
becomes the totality of the will. Since success is nevertheless equated with a 
demonstration of power, it goes unnoticed that the consequences are most likely the result 
of someone else’s will or just good fortune. In such instances, the will does not 
command; it merely predicts. The will is no longer a will to power, but a will to hope. It 
is far better, Nietzsche suggests, to fail on our own account, not to command, than to 
confuse someone else’s successes with our will. Although the perception of power may 
be similar, the actual amount of power, most evident in future acts of willing, is 
diminished significantly. Hence “human nature finds it harder to endure a victory than a 
defeat; indeed, it seems to be easier to achieve victory than to endure it in such a way that 
it does not in fact turn into a defeat” (Nietzsche 1997b, §1). In this sense, victory is a 
greater test of the will. In either event, the will is more than a series of sensations and 
thoughts: it is foremost an instance of command. An act of the will is predicated on: “the 
inward certainty that obedience will be rendered — and whatever else belongs to the 
position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself that 
renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). As 
Nietzsche tells it, “one is a cause oneself only when one knows that one has performed an 
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act of will” (Nietzsche 1968, §136). Life is fundamentally the will to power, the doctrine 
that “every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment” (Nietzsche 1966, 
§22).  
 
The extreme form of this doctrine, however, is the belief that the will is totally free, “the 
hundred-times-refuted theory of a ‘free will’” (Nietzsche 1966, §18). “Extravagant pride” 
has led man to believe that he is an autonomous creature, that his will is entirely free. 
This view, “the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions 
oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society[,] involves nothing 
less than to be precisely this causa sui and…to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, 
out of a swamp of nothingness” (Nietzsche 1966, §21). Nietzsche challenges the 
absurdity of this position by presenting the opposite (and equally problematic) claim, that 
the will is not “free” at all.  
 
This “unfreedom of the will” is held in two different ways. The first is to accept without 
question the responsibility for all actions, regardless of their cause. Nietzsche claims that 
this view is held mainly by “vain races” (Nietzsche 1966, §21). “Others,” Nietzsche 
continues, “do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing 
to an inward self-contempt, seek to lay the blame for themselves somewhere else” 
(Nietzsche 1966, §21). In both instances the will is either given credit for everything or 
denied blame for anything. Both positions, Nietzsche argues, are examples of the “misuse 
of cause and effect” (Nietzsche 1966, §21). “The ‘unfree will’ is mythology,” Nietzsche 
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concludes. “In real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills” (Nietzsche 1966, 
§21). Lest we forget into which category we fall, Nietzsche reminds us: “Today the taste 
of the time and the virtue of the time weakens and thins down the will; nothing is as 
timely as weakness of the will” (Nietzsche 1966, §212). 
 
These errors of the will manifest themselves in politics as well. Political men often 
confuse their will with successes that occur during their watch; they too profess a sort of 
“freedom of the will” (Nietzsche 1968, §136). Nietzsche ends the section sarcastically by 
declaring that a philosopher should “claim the right to include willing as such within the 
sphere of morals” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Simply put, if everyone — including and 
especially rulers — thinks himself “free” to exercise his will and satisfy desires, why has 
no one seized the opportunity to rule? Nietzsche’s implicit claim is that philosophers are 
among those claiming “freedom of the will,” that they too wish to be ruled; hence it is no 
wonder that the will has gone unappreciated. 
 
Your Truth or Your Life 
 
The first mention of the will in Beyond Good and Evil occurs in the first section as “the 
will to truth.” Although the book opens in a philosophic tone, Nietzsche seeks to 
determine the value of what heretofore has been philosophy’s will. He begins by 
questioning why truth has been so venerated by philosophers: “What in us really wants 
‘truth’?” he asks. “Why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?” (Nietzsche 
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1966, §1). What are the forces behind the moral turn in philosophy? In this formulation, 
truth is not a solution; it is the problem.  
 
Nietzsche’s answer is that the “drive to knowledge” is not and has never been the “father 
of philosophy” (Nietzsche 1966, §6). Philosophy, he contends, is not simply the pursuit 
of truth. The reality is more insidious: “anyone who considers the basic drives of 
man…will find that all of them have done philosophy at some time — and that every 
single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the ultimate purpose 
of existence and legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to be 
master — and it attempts to philosophize in that spirit” (Nietzsche 1966, §6). Thus, for 
Nietzsche, philosophy is not the will to truth; it is a manifestation of the will to power. 
Philosophers — “wily spokesman for their prejudices which they baptize ‘truths’” 
(Nietzsche 1966, §5) — are neither honest nor courageous in that they do not speak to, 
much less admit, the true nature of their actions, even when they are aware of what they 
are doing. “Truths” are nothing more than our “irrefutable errors,” Nietzsche claims 
(Nietzsche 1974, §265). “The essence of a thing is only an opinion about the ‘thing,’” he 
writes (Nietzsche 1968, §556). In sum, “all valuations are only consequences and narrow 
perspectives in the service of this one will: valuation itself is only this will to power” 
(Nietzsche 1968, §675).  
 
Nietzsche directed his assault on truth against Plato’s metaphysics, the standard-bearer of 
the will to truth, and Kant, Plato’s heir apparent. In light of Nietzsche’s teaching on the 
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will to power, philosophy’s metaphysical claims come to the fore as a construction of the 
will. “As soon as any philosophy begins to believe in itself,” Nietzsche contends, “it 
always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise. Philosophy is this 
tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the ‘creation of the world,’ to 
the causa prima” (Nietzsche 1966, §9). Hence previous philosophers are not truly 
philosophers; they have loved their truths, but not truth as such. “Plato, as the artist he 
was, preferred appearance to being!” Nietzsche writes. “Lie and invention to truth! the 
unreal to the actual! But he was so convinced of the value of appearance that he gave it 
the attributes ‘being,’ ‘causality’ and ‘goodness,’ and ‘truth,’ in short everything men 
value” (Nietzsche 1968, §572). Not only is Plato’s philosophy his creation, but he used it 
for his own political purposes. Nietzsche sees the eide not as universal truth, but as 
Plato’s will to power. 2  
 
As a result, Nietzsche deems the ancient quarrel between the poets and the philosophers 
as a sham: Socrates and Plato were poets, too — poets clever enough to mask their faulty 
moralism and self-serving politics. It is no wonder that Plato kept a copy of Aristophanes 
“under the pillow of his deathbed…. How could even Plato have endured life — a Greek 
life he repudiated — without an Aristophanes?” (Nietzsche 1966, §28). In Nietzsche’s 
estimation, Socrates and Plato have lost their moral authority to speak on behalf of the 
good and the just: their ruse has been found out. “That is all over now,” he might say to 
them (Nietzsche 1974, §357). Platonic philosophy is the cause of the modern dilemma. If 
Socrates is a decadent, then Nietzsche wishes to be “the opposite of a decadent” 
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(Nietzsche 1989a, Wise §2). Nietzsche’s aim is to rid philosophy of masks and release 
man’s natural creative energies.  
 
The same is true of religious figures. Paul, we should recall, appears in Nietzsche’s 
writings not only as a political actor, but as “the greatest of all apostles of vengeance” 
(Nietzsche 1982a, §45). We note, however, that while Nietzsche is hostile to Christianity, 
he is unexpectedly sympathetic to Jesus. In Nietzsche’s estimation, youth almost always 
excuses ignorance (Nietzsche 1982b, ‘Death’). What is more, Jesus’ teachings, as 
Nietzsche tells it, were much different from what is now preached in his name. Nietzsche 
believes that Christianity was founded as a break from the teachings of Jesus; it was Paul 
who distorted what Jesus had said and made Christianity the religion that it is today. If 
Paul, the true founder of Christianity, did for Jesus what Plato did for Socrates, it is no 
wonder that Nietzsche does not want any followers (Nietzsche 1989a, Destiny §1). 
 
The problem, Nietzsche contends, is that metaphysical philosophers, and with them 
religious thinkers, do not take their bearings from nature, properly understood. Most 
contemplative individuals are animated by concerns for a world and a life different from 
the one in which we find ourselves, and as a result, “philosophy, religion, and morality 
are symptoms of decadence” (Nietzsche 1968, §586C).  
 
Although it is relatively new, the belief in metaphysics, Nietzsche argues, has already 
produced disastrous results: “That for thousands of years European thinkers thought 
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merely in order to prove something — today, conversely, we suspect every thinker who 
‘wants to prove something’ — that the conclusions that ought to be the result of their 
most rigorous reflection were always settled from the start…this tyranny, this caprice, 
this rigorous and grandiose stupidity had educated the spirit” (Nietzsche 1966, §188). 
Metaphysics has made the philosophic endeavor one-dimensional, casting even non-
metaphysical philosophy in an all too metaphysical light.  
 
Nietzsche counsels us that the metaphysical posture of philosophy is not as old as its 
practitioners allege: “it was only very late that truth emerged — as the weakest form of 
knowledge” (Nietzsche 1974, §110). Truth as an end, as the standard for judgment, is a 
recent, and therefore uncertain, phenomenon. It is problematic, Nietzsche charges, in that 
it is potentially at odds with human nature: “It seemed that one was unable to live with 
[truth]: our organism was prepared for the opposite; all its higher functions, sense 
perception and every kind of sensation worked with those basic errors which had been 
incorporated since time immemorial” (Nietzsche 1974, §110). If living without truth 
demanded strength, then the demand for truth has made man weak. “It is more 
comfortable to obey than to examine,” Nietzsche laments (Nietzsche 1968, §452). 
Metaphysics is an emotional crutch, supporting the fragile modern psyche. In this, we are 
all letzten Menschen. Nietzsche wishes to eliminate truth as the standard for knowledge 
and “dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil” (Nietzsche 1967a, Self-Criticism 
§7). 
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 8 (2004): 34-61 
____________________________________________________ 
   
 
 
   
Steven Michels 
  
47
This is not to say that Nietzsche is enthusiastically nihilistic, for he disdains those who 
are unconditionally anti-modern: “‘Everything is subjective,’ you say; but even this is 
interpretation” (Nietzsche 1968, §481). While it is correct that much of modernity is 
objectionable, it too possesses elements of truth. To reject the whole of the modern 
project, to be unqualifiedly or anti-modern, is just as adverse to philosophy, as being fully 
modern. Nietzsche is suspicious of historicism, since “it is a prejudice of the learned that 
we now know better than any age” (Nietzsche 1997a, §2). The possibility, and even the 
likelihood, that an objective truth exists Nietzsche leaves virtually untouched; he believes 
that such an animal exists. “As Nietzsche understands it,” Ted Sadler writes, 
“perspectivism does not rule out, but rather presupposes, an absolutistic conception of 
truth. Only when this is understood can the authentically philosophical radicalism of 
Nietzsche’s thought emerge, as opposed to the mere epistemological radicalism of 
postmodernist pluralism and other forms of relativism” (1995, p. 13). If an objective truth 
does exist, however, it cannot serve as the foundation for human activity, since we have 
no means of ascertaining its nature. Yet, far from dismissing truth, Nietzsche has high 
regard for it, perhaps even the highest: “In the end [truth] is a woman: she should not be 
violated” (Nietzsche 1966, §220). 
 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche fails to comprehend why anyone, much less those professing a 
love of truth, would “prefer even a handful of ‘certainty’ to a whole carload of beautiful 
possibilities” (Nietzsche 1966, §10). Science limits and stunts the growth of man, both 
intellectually and spiritually: 
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A ‘scientific’ interpretation of the world, as you understand it, 
might therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible 
interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the 
poorest in meaning…. But an essentially mechanical world 
would be an essentially meaningless world. Assuming that one 
estimated the value of a piece of music according to how much 
of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas: 
how absurd would such a ‘scientific’ estimation of music be!” 
What would one have comprehended, understood, grasped of it? 
Nothing, really nothing of what is ‘music’ in it! (Nietzsche 1974, 
§373)  
 
 
Science is unable to speak to the ends of human activity. At its best, science can provide 
only facts; it cannot speak to the values of a political community. Nietzsche defines 
science as “the transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of mastering 
nature”; it “belongs under the rubric ‘means’” (Nietzsche 1968, §610). Provided that it is 
placed in the hands of Nietzsche’s new philosophers, science may be useful as a means, 
but as an end in itself, it is highly suspect.  
 
As it now stands, faith in reason and science does not and can never provide a firm basis 
on which to ground political life. “What is science for at all if it has no time for culture?” 
Nietzsche asks. “What is the Whence, Whither, To what end of science if it is not to lead 
to culture? To lead to barbarism, perhaps?” (Nietzsche 1997b, §8). Yet, later he asks: 
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Why do we fear and hate a possible reversion to barbarism? 
Because it would make people unhappier than they are? Oh 
no! The barbarians of every age were happier….The reason is 
that our drive to knowledge has become too strong for us to be 
able to want happiness without knowledge or the happiness of 
a strong, firmly rooted delusion….Knowledge has in us been 
transformed into a passion which shrinks at no sacrifice and at 
bottom fears nothing but its own extinction….Perhaps 
mankind will even perish of this passion for knowledge!…if 
mankind does not perish of a passion it will perish of a 
weakness. (Nietzsche 1997a, §429)  
 
 
In practice, the quest for truth has often come at the expense of man and society, which 
includes the moral standing of its practitioners: “In antiquity the dignity and recognition 
of science were diminished by the fact that even her most zealous disciples placed the 
striving for virtue first, and one felt that knowledge had received the highest praise when 
one celebrated it as the best means to virtue. It is something new in history that 
knowledge wants to be more than a mere means” (Nietzsche 1974, §123). If anything, 
Nietzsche claims, man will live better, both individually and collectively, by a change in 
what is called truth. 
 
What is Life? 
Although Nietzsche concludes that the will to power is the fundamental fact of nature, 
there are those who doubt the viability or the desirability of such a teaching. Some 
maintain (Rosen 1989, Berkowitz 1995) that deviating from a just and moral order would 
invariably result in instability or even chaos. Mankind, this view alleges, needs a firm set 
of values in order to live ethically. Destroying, or even undermining, such an order can 
have grave consequences. In response, Nietzsche argues the opposite: “it is not conflict of 
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opinions that has made history so violent but conflict of belief in opinions, that is to say 
conflict of convictions” (Nietzsche 1996, §630). The real chaos and the greatest danger 
lie in using an absolute (and therefore impossible) goal as the foundation for moral and 
political life. If man were focused instead on strength and intellectual honesty, the world 
would be more peaceful. “Three-quarters of all the evil done in the world happens out of 
timidity,” Nietzsche writes. “And this is above all a psychological problem” (Nietzsche 
1997a, §538). It is acknowledging the limits on truth that makes men tolerant, peaceful, 
and happy. “Convictions are prisons” to be avoided at all costs (Nietzsche 1982a, §54). 
 
It is these same convictions that have led man to pursue absolute truth. “The methodical 
search for truth,” Nietzsche posits, “is a product of those ages in which convictions were 
at war with one another. If the individual had not been concerned with his ‘truth,’ that is 
to say with his being in the right, there would have been no methods of inquiry at all” 
(Nietzsche 1996, §634). The search for truth easily becomes the demand for truth and the 
desire to prove the truth of our claims. “‘Truth’ is,” Nietzsche writes, “more fateful than 
error and ignorance, because it cuts off the forces that work toward enlightenment and 
knowledge” (Nietzsche 1968, §452). In this respect, “half-knowledge is more victorious 
than whole knowledge,” Nietzsche claims. “It understands things as being more simple 
than they are and this renders its opinions more easily intelligible and more convincing” 
(Nietzsche 1996, §578).  
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Appreciating the shortcomings of truth does not entail a thorough embrace of ignorance 
or a deliberate and exuberant return to the Dark Ages, the other objection to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. “Without this new passion — I mean the passion to know,” Nietzsche 
declares, “science would still be promoted; after all, science has grown and matured 
without it until now” (Nietzsche 1974, §123). 3 Recent advances in science have occurred 
despite, not because of, the modern perspective on reason and truth. “We all know how 
our age is typified by its pursuit of science,” Nietzsche charges.  
 
We know it because it is part of our life: and that precisely is the 
reason almost no one asks himself what the consequences of 
such an involvement with the science could be for culture, even 
supposing that the will and the capacity to promote culture were 
everywhere to hand. For the nature of scientific man … contains 
a real paradox…. He seems to be permitted to squander his life 
on questions whose answer could at bottom be of consequence 
only to someone assured of an eternity. (Nietzsche 1997b, §8) 
 
 
Reason is hostile to life not only in the answers that it finds, but in the sorts of questions 
it poses. In a sense, modernity is too concerned with method to concern itself with 
wisdom (Nietzsche 1968, §466). Rejecting truth as a standard does not mean that man’s 
growth will be arrested.  
 
There is a great difference, Nietzsche explains, between what is true and what is useful. 
“It is no more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than mere appearance; it is 
even the worst proved assumption there is in the world” (Nietzsche 1966, §34). “Man has 
been educated by his errors,” says Nietzsche.  
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First he always saw himself incompletely; second, he endowed 
himself with fictitious attributes; third, he placed himself in a 
false order of rank in relation to animals and nature; fourth, he 
invented a new tables of goods and always accepted them for a 
time as eternal and unconditional: as a result of this, now one 
and now another human impulse and state held first place and 
was ennobled because it was esteemed so highly. If we 
removed the effects of these four errors, we should also 
remove humanity, humaneness, and ‘human dignity.’ 
(Nietzsche 1974, §115)  
 
 
It might also be that falsehood is equally, or perhaps more, essential to life than is truth. 
There may be no fundamental difference between “the true, the truthful, and selfless” and 
“deception, selfishness, and lust”; the latter may be of even greater value (Nietzsche 
1966, §2).  
 
This is not to say that error cannot also cause great suffering, for man has been harmed by 
his errors, too: “Error is the most expensive luxury that man can permit himself; and if 
the error happens to be a physiological error, then it is perilous to life” (Nietzsche 1968, 
§453). The key question concerns the impact that knowledge has on life: “The falseness 
of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment….The question is to 
what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-
cultivating” (Nietzsche 1966, §4). Life is often served greater by error than by truth. 
Truth, Nietzsche argues, is not good for its own sake; rather, it is only good to the extent 
that it serves life.  
 
Replacing truth with life as a standard, however, presents its own set of difficulties. Most 
important, how is it to be measured? For this, Nietzsche looks to his will to power: “What 
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is good?” he asks. “Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to 
power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness” (Nietzsche 1982a, 
§ 2). With Nietzsche, happiness is “the feeling that power is growing, that resistance is 
overcome” (Nietzsche 1982a, §2). It is not a question of virtue but one of “fitness” 
(Nietzsche 1982a, §2). The will to power is the will to life. “If this should be an 
innovation as a theory — as a reality it is the primordial fact [Ur-Faktum] of all history: 
people ought to be honest with themselves at least that far” (Nietzsche 1966, §259).  
 
Nietzsche uses the will to power to describe his sense of the good and the desirable. If we 
were to think of pleasure and pain, we would eventually be drawn to the will to power:  
 
If the innermost essence of being is will to power, if pleasure is 
every increase of power, displeasure every feeling of not being 
able to resist or dominate; may we not then posit pleasure and 
displeasure as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two 
oscillations of Yes and No? — But who feels pleasure? — But 
who wants power? — Absurd question, if the essence itself is 
power-will and consequently feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure! (Nietzsche 1968, §693) 
 
 
Pain, to the extent that we can speak of such feeling, is not the frustration of the will; 
rather, “the feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact 
that the will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance” (Nietzsche 1968, 
§696). The strength of the will is predicated on the amount of strength gathered in 
opposition to it. Pleasure and growth are coeval and linked to the will to power. 
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True “growth” — an increase of the will’s power — is revealed in and determined by the 
ability to gain from experience. “Life itself,” Nietzsche writes 
 
is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien 
and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own 
forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation… if 
it is a living and not a dying body, [it] has to do to other bodies 
what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it 
will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, 
spread, seize, become predominant — not from any morality or 
immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will 
to power. (Nietzsche 1966, §259) 
 
 
The will to power is superior in that it not only accepts the contradictory, the ability to 
“appropriate the foreign,” it incorporates the contradictory into its system and appreciates 
it as such (Nietzsche 1966, §230). The will, and more importantly the growth of the will, 
is the source of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  
 
Even when tension occurs, it too can provide a great source of strength. The potential of 
perspective is related to the belief in the will to power and the growth process. For 
Nietzsche, “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more 
affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to 
observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’ 
be” (Nietzsche 1989b, §3.12).  
 
Yet there is another, seemingly opposite, drive that resembles this spirit. It is 
fundamentally the rejection of new experiences, a “deliberate exclusion, a shutting of 
one’s windows, an internal No to this or that, a refusal to let things approach, a kind of 
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state of defense against much that is knowable, a satisfaction with the dark, with the 
limiting horizon, a Yea and Amen to ignorance” (Nietzsche 1966, §230). Here, the will 
rejects the unknown; it is unable to withstand the tests of strength that experience 
requires. Nietzsche’s presents this spirit as a “stomach” that lacks “digestive capacity” 
(Nietzsche 1966, §230). The will’s capacity for growth does not mean that it always 
grows: the will is more likely to wither than thrive. Being healthy is not a state but a 
process through which strength is sought and achieved. Modern culture is diseased 
because it does not understand the conditions for its health, much less strive to attain 
those conditions. True strength and true growth of the will mean enduring the unfamiliar 
and exploring the dangerous.  
 
Action, Nietzsche tells us, is primarily instinctive. The same is true of conscious thinking. 
Nietzsche notes: “just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be 
recognized as ingredients of the will, so secondly, should thinking also: in every act of 
the will there is a ruling thought” (Nietzsche 1966, §19). Thinking too is an element of 
the will, an activity guided by the same physiological forces. To remove this activity 
from the will is to eliminate the will altogether. To conceive of thinking, or philosophy 
for that matter, without reference to the will, is to misconstrue the composition and the 
method of the will. Philosophy is also an instinct; consequently, “behind all logic and its 
seeming sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, 
physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life” (Nietzsche 1966, §3). 
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Much of our “truth” derives from considerations of life and its preservation. The new 
philosophy is driven primarily by a concern for health. 
 
This view of the will and growth is tied to the philosophy of the future. If Nietzsche 
intends to use life as the standard by which to order rank and judge truth, the two are 
connected through philosophy: the philosophers of the future are those best able to realize 
life as a value and philosophize in that spirit. Nietzsche’s new philosophy breaks from the 
moralistic tradition of philosophy and uses life as the standard for judgment. 
 
Conclusion: Outside the Inside 
 
There are, we must admit, two great difficulties concerning Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
will. First, is life, or growth, an unambiguous standard? Nietzsche himself is aware of this 
difficulty:  
 
One would require a position outside of life, and yet have to 
know it as well as one, as many, as all who have lived it, in order 
to be permitted even to touch the problem of the value of life: 
reasons enough to comprehend that this problem is for us an 
unapproachable problem. When we speak of values, we speak 
with the inspiration, with the way of looking at things, which is 
part of life: life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values 
through us when we posit values. (Nietzsche 1982c, ‘Morality’ 
§5) 
 
 
The second question has to do with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. How can the will to power 
be, or even serve, as the foundation for life, given what Nietzsche says of universal truth? 
How does it comport with his post-metaphysical philosophy? Nietzsche’s revision of the 
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scientific method is related to his faith in the value of perspective and the recognition of 
the will as a thesis to be tested. “The question is in the end,” Nietzsche declares, “whether 
we really recognize the will as efficient, whether we believe in the causality of the will: if 
we do — and at bottom our faith in this is nothing less than our faith in causality itself — 
then we have to make the experiment of positing the causality of the will hypothetically 
as the only one” (Nietzsche 1966, §36). While Nietzsche is skeptical of cause and effect 
as a science, he does leave faith in causation untouched, for “to eliminate the will 
altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this — what 
would that mean but to castrate the intellect?” (Nietzsche 1989b, §3.12). Viewing the 
will as the principal cause is an experiment that must be conducted. Short of this, 
philosophy becomes ideology and faith becomes nihilism. “In short,” Nietzsche 
concludes, “one has to risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever 
‘effects’ are recognized — and whether all mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a 
force is active in them, will force, effects of will” (Nietzsche 1966, §36; emphasis added). 
The will as causation is an experiment marking a new philosopher. 
 
Although his defense of life as the standard for truth and philosophy emerges from his 
perspectivism, Nietzsche claims superiority for his approach and defends it as such:  
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Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire 
instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic 
form of the will — namely, of the will to power, as my 
proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced 
back to this will to power and one could also find in it the 
solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment — it is 
one problem — then one would have gained the right to 
determine all efficient force univocally as — will to power. The 
world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined 
according to its ‘intelligible character’ — it would be ‘will to 
power’ and nothing else. (Nietzsche 1966, §36) 
 
 
“Suppose,” Nietzsche warns — twice. Although the will to power is presented here as a 
thesis to be tested, it is one that Nietzsche endorses as the “fundamental fact of nature.” 4 
It is true because it serves life better than any other alternative. Viewing the whole of 
nature as the will to power is the surest means to the health and growth of individuals 
and, through individuals, culture.  
 
If we are to truly know the will, we must first admit what we do not know of it. Williams’ 
conclusion seems to negate her premise that Nietzsche presents the will to power in 
various forms throughout his writings. If the will to power can only be appreciated in its 
entirety through his perspectivism, then it makes little, or even no, difference how the 
development of the will to power is understood, only that we take every perspective 
possible, Nietzsche’s included. What is more, her suggestion that “viewing the will to 
power as a consciously chosen perspective from which to interpret the world eliminates 
any need to argue about whether the will to power is metaphysical, cosmological, or 
ontological” (2001, p. 130) clearly runs afoul of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and is in fact 
the opposite of Nietzsche’s stated desire. 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 8 (2004): 34-61 
____________________________________________________ 
   
 
 
   
Steven Michels 
  
59
 
The will to power appears in nature as a source of order, without presupposing nature 
itself as an ordering principle. Furthermore, it is not metaphysical because Nietzsche 
presents the will to power as a claim on truth, not as self-evidently true or absolute. 
Where Plato brings the will to its knees, Nietzsche raises it to the heavens. The will to 
power may begin as perspective, but it ends as ontology. 
 
NOTES
                                                 
1 For a discussion on the will to power as a deceptive or rhetorical device, see Charles E. Scott, “The 
Mask of Nietzsche’s Self-Overcoming,” Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, Clayton 
Koelb, ed. (Nietzsche 1982a, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 217-229. 
Scott concludes that the notion of will to power sets aside solutions in favor of a series of more 
robust questions. Scott claims, “in Nietzsche’s mask of self-overcoming, question dominates solution 
and sets in motion a distinctive way of thinking that forms in the self-overcoming movements” (p. 
229). 
 
2 Richard Rorty calls Plato a “power freak” and credits him with the emergence of pragmatism: “We 
have become pragmatists. But we only took the path that leads to pragmatism because Plato told us 
that we had to take evidence and certainty, and therefore skepticism, seriously.” “Heidegger, 
Contingency, and Pragmatism,” Essays on Heidegger and others: Philosophical papers, vol. 2 (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 30-31. Furthermore, Rorty interprets Heidegger to mean that 
a self-conscious pragmatism is preferable to the “repressed and self-deceived” alternative provided 
by Plato (p. 32). For Rorty, pragmatism is really the best outcome of the Platonic tradition. 
 
3 “Knowledge grows as and when the gods are ceasing to be good; it springs from the egoism of 
individuals seeking their fortunes (for example, through navigation); it is elaborated as a variety of 
aristocratic amusement; and finally the urge to know arises in those who, becoming tired of the ebb 
and flow of popular opinion, want something solid to cling to.” Keith M. May, Nietzsche on the Struggle 
between Knowledge and Wisdom (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. xi. 
 
4 Daniel Conway argues that Nietzsche fails to prove the hypothesis of the will to power: “The world 
viewed ‘from inside’ thus remains a project rather than an accomplishment.” “Revisiting the Will to 
Power: Active Nihilism and the Project of Trans-human Philosophy,” Nihilism Now! Monsters of 
Energy, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Diane Morgan, eds. (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 
136. 
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